Introduction and Objectives
Farm household assets can be classified into two main different types; off-farm and on-farm investments. The former are not directly related to farming activities and are based on non-farming assets such as financial assets. These investments are generally used by farmers to effectively stabilize the financial performance of their farm income and to reduce risk in their economic results. On the other hand, on-farm investments are directed toward farming activities to improve or support agricultural practices and to ensure a regular flow of goods and services. In this regard, on-farm investments involve assets such as farm machinery, farm buildings, land improvements and other farming assets.
Farmer behaviour towards investment and production decisions has been the focus of numerous studies. While Mishra and Morehart (2001) , Gustafson and Chama (1994) and Serra et al. (2004) , among others, have assessed non-farm investment decisions, on-farm investments have received even more attention in the literature. Oude Lansink et al. (2001) analyse the factors that determine farmer investment in energysaving systems. Carey and Zilberman (2002) analyze investments in modern irrigation systems and technologies. Baer and Brown (2006) assess the investments in internet technology to improve farming business results. Wabi et al. (2006) analyze the investment in integrated pest management systems. Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) carry out a literature review to identify the variables that are significant in explaining farmers' adoption of innovations and investment.
Findings from previous research allow us to classify variables that usually influence farmers' investment decisions into non-economic and economic factors. The former factors are represented by a) Farmer characteristics, such as age, gender, education, social status, farming experience or knowledge; b) Farmer attitudes and opinions like risk aversion, membership in organizations, political opinion, source of information or environmental preferences; and c) Agronomic characteristics, such as soil fertility and degree of erosion, or animal welfare. The economic factors include a) farm management issues including input use intensity, family and hired labour, farm size, production costs, crop diversity, gross farm income, off-farm activities, debt level, access to credit, extension and technical assistance, farm productivity and efficiency; and b) Exogenous factors like the market size, policy support, input and output prices, interest rate and price variation.
Among the economic factors, agricultural policy support has been shown to play a relevant role in investment decisions (Sckokai, 2005; Coyle, 2005 and Cahill, 2005) . This is particularly relevant in the cereal, oilseed and protein (COP) crops sector, which has received considerable attention within the EU agricultural policy. Over the last years, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) applied to the COP sector has undergone an important reform process characterized by a reduction in price supports. Direct income supports were introduced to compensate farmers for their reduced income due to reduced prices. These supports were defined as area payments on the basis of historical average yields and arable crops area. Several authors (see, e.g., Moro and Sckokai, 1999; Peerlings, 1996 and Serra et al., 2005a) have concluded that these payments are only partially decoupled (PD) since they contain some elements of support still tied to farmers' production decisions. The CAP reform process culminated with the 2003 reform that introduced the single farm payment, defined as a fully decoupled measure (FD) since payments were not theoretically related to production decisions. Guyomard et al., 1996; or Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996) . Although, to date, only a few unpublished studies have analysed the impacts of the PD support scheme on investment decisions in the EU context (Sckokai, 2005) , this is the first attempt to analyse this issue specifically for Spain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides more details on the COP sector and the CAP support received by this sector. The next two sections introduce the econometric framework and the empirical implementation. In Section 5 the results are discussed. Finally, some conclusions are outlined.
The COP sector and the CAP Reforms
The EU-27 is the third world's largest producer of cereals with 12.12% of global production, behind the USA (15.60%) and China (20.05%), and is the first worldwide producer of barley (40.5%) and wheat (20.8%) (FAOSTAT, 2007) . The EU-27 COP sector represents 76.5% of total utilized agricultural area (UAA) and 37.2% of total crop production (FAOSTAT, 2007) . In 2006, the most important cereal producers within the EU-27 were France and Germany, representing 23.27% and 14.76% of total EU production, respectively, followed by Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. The Spanish COP sector occupies 59.0% of the Spanish UAA and represents 30.2% of the Spanish total crop production. As can be seen in Table 1 , during the period of analysis (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) cereals represent the most important crop within the Spanish COP sector, followed by protein and oilseed crops. Moreover, the Spanish COP sector represents 10.1% of the total European (EU-27) COP UAA and 6.83% of the total European COP production. (Serra et al., 2005a) . The 1992 reform was mainly focused on the COP sector and was characterized by a substantial reduction in guaranteed prices. Oilseed and protein crop guaranteed prices were abolished, while cereal prices were reduced by one third. In order to compensate farmers' income decline, an area payment defined on the basis of historical regional average yields and arable crop areas was introduced. Moreover, professional producers were required to set aside a percentage of their cultivated area in exchange for set aside premium.
The so called Agenda 2000 continued to further decouple support received by farmers. The guaranteed price for cereals was reduced by 15% and the direct payment increased by the same proportion (Table 2) . Direct payments to oilseed crops were reduced to the cereals' payment level. Direct payments to protein crops were also reduced but kept above the cereal and oilseed payments, to ensure the relative profitability of protein crops. It is worth mentioning that the novelty of this reform is defined by the support for the rural economy as a whole and the overall contribution of farmers to society, rather than supporting them for what they produce. In 2003, another substantial reform (Mid Term Review) was approved aiming at increasing farmers' efficiency, reducing the negative environmental externalities of agriculture, and maintaining farm income without distorting farm production decisions. The single farm payment was introduced as a key element in the new farm support system. This latter reform started to operate in the 2006-2007 season. Due to the lack of data to analyse the latter reform, our study focuses on the consequences of the Agenda 2000 on on-farm investments. Results provide guidance regarding the expected consequences of the latter reform. 
The theoretical and econometric frameworks
Our empirical analysis is based on a reduced-form application of the dual model of investment under uncertainty developed by Sckokai (2005) . The conceptual foundations of this model rely on the duality theory results from McLaren and Cooper (1980) and Epstein (1981) . Under the assumptions that farmers produce a single output, are not risk neutral and take their decisions to maximize discounted utility over an infinite horizon, the value of the firm can be represented as (Sckokai, 2005 ):
where function u is the expected utility of wealth which is assumed to depend on the expected farm's wealth ( A ); the variance of wealth ( A is a farm's initial wealth; p is the expected market output price; y is the farm output production function; w is the known variable input price; x is the quantity used of a variable input; c is the capital rental price, also assumed to be known; S includes the CAP direct payments to COP crops; 
Since not every farm invests in every asset nor produces each crop considered, a censoring issue underlies the empirical model. To handle this issue, we use the Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) estimation procedure that is described below. Let , 1,..., Equation (2) can alternatively be expressed as:
where F and H are vectors containing the censored and non-censored variables respectively, β β β β and γ γ γ γ are vectors of parameters and t denotes each observation. In order to estimate (3) we follow the twostep procedure outlined by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) .
In the first step, the discrete variable indicating a non-censored observation of ( 0)
evaluated through a probit model of the form:
( , )
where t Z represents a vector of exogenous variables that can or cannot coincide with t X and α α α α is a vector of parameters. In the second step, the normal cumulative distribution function ( , ) t Φ Z α α α α and the normal probability density function ( , ) t φ Z α α α α derived from the probit model are used to construct correction terms in the censored equations in system (3). Thus, the resulting system can be rewritten as:
( , ) 
which is estimated by the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Procedure.
Following Su and Yen (2000), it should be noted that parameter estimates derived from the Shonkwiler and Yen two-step method might disguise the actual effects of the explanatory variables. This would be especially true when a common explanatory variable is used in the first and second stages of the estimation process. This common variable affects the dependent variable through the index 
where subindex z represents the explanatory variable whose marginal effect is being computed.
As Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) note, the error term derived from the second step of the method is heteroscedastic. In light of this problem, we use Monte Carlo bootstrapping procedures to derive consistent variance-covariance estimates for the parameters of the model 1 .
Empirical implementation
Farm-level data for a sample of Spanish farms specialized in the production of COP crops are utilized. Data are taken from the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) for the period 2000-2004, a period during which the Agenda 2000 reforms were effective. The FADN data set is a harmonized source of information for European production that includes technical, financial and economic data on farming. Though our analysis is based on farm-level data, aggregate statistics are also used to define some variables not included in FADN. Country-level nominal market inflation rates and interest rates have been taken from the official statistics published by EUROSTAT (2007) and OECD (2007), respectively. 1 1,000 pseudo-samples of the same size as the actual sample, drawn with replacement, to provide a sample of parameter estimates from which we estimate the parameter covariance matrix. For each pseudo-sample of data, Shonkwiler and Yen's two-step method is applied to estimate the parameters of the model. The covariance matrices are derived from the distribution of the replicated estimates generated in the bootstrap process. The standard errors of the marginal effects are also derived using the replicated marginal effect estimates from the bootstrapped samples.
In our empirical application, the model presented in (2) is generalized to consider a multi-output firm, as well as the investment in different types of assets. We distinguish between two output types: 1) cereals and 2) oilseeds and protein crops. As explained, the regulation of these crops is very similar. However, while cereals continue to have an intervention price, oilseed and protein crops do not. Additionally, cereals represent the main crop for the farms in our sample (see Table 3 ). The two-output specification is also motivated by this fact: we observe cereals as one single entity instead of aggregating them into a wider group in light of their importance. k − ) and of building and land improvement ( 2, 1 k − ).
Other explanatory variables not included in the theoretical framework, but shown by previous research to be relevant when explaining production decisions are also considered. These variables include the age of the manager ( g ) of the holding and the proportion of rented land over total land ( PR 
Results
Parameter estimates of the SUR model and the marginal effects are presented in Table 4 . As mentioned, in those cases where the decision variables are censored (machinery, building and land improvement investments, and oilseeds and protein crops area), we rely on marginal effects for the interpretation of our results, because parameter estimates derived from Shonkwiler and Yen two-step method might be masking the actual effects of the explanatory variables.
As shown by previous research (Sckokai, 2005) , government payments can impact production decisions through different mechanisms. First, they can influence production decisions by altering relative market prices. Second, they can also alter farmers' risk preferences by altering price or revenue uncertainty and exogenous income. As has been shown by previous research (Sandmo, 1971 ; Chavas and Pope 1985; Hennesy, 1998 and Serra, et al., 2006), a change in risk preferences are likely to have an effect on production decisions. Finally, government payments can have dynamic effects on production by stimulating changes in investment demand (Sckokai, 2005 and Coyle, 2005) .
Subsidy parameter estimates suggest that an increase in PD payments ( S ) increases the investment in building and land improvement ( 1 k ). In addition, both PD payments and rural development subsidies ( r S ), have a positive impact on machinery and equipment investment ( 2 k ). Since farm output is a function of different inputs including the level of capital, which depends on past decisions on investments, the impact of CAP subsidies on investment demand will have long-lasting (dynamic) impacts on production.
PD payments further stimulate production by motivating an increase in the use of variable inputs. These results are consistent with those obtained by Serra et al. (2005a) who found area payments in the COP sector to motivate an increase in the use of crop protection products, thus suggesting that they are not fully decoupled. Finally PD payments are found to influence land allocation by stimulating an increase in the area devoted to cereals, the predominant crop within the Spanish COP sector.
The initial wealth coefficient estimate demonstrate that an increase in farm's wealth causes an increase in the area devoted to cereal crops as well as an increase in variable input use. The relevance of wealth in explaining production decisions is compatible with the relevance of risk attitudes in explaining production behavior. It is widely accepted that an economic agent's degree of risk aversion decreases with wealth (Sandmo, 1971; . Hence, wealthier farmers, in being less risk averse, are likely to be more prone to expand their business size. These results together with the subsidy parameter estimates suggest that agricultural subsidies can have relevant wealth effects. Because government payments contribute to enhanced wealth, they lead to increasing output supply and input demand. Serra et al. (2005b) , suggested that direct costs of land rentals may create stronger incentives to work the land more intensively, relative to the opportunity costs borne by owned fields. Compatible with this hypothesis, our results show that those farms with a higher proportion of rented area ( PR ) are more prone to invest in machinery and use more variable inputs. They are also more likely to devote more land to grow cereals to the detriment of land allocated to oilseed and protein crops.
Farmer's age is an indicator of farmer's experience. Results demonstrate that an increase in the age ( g ) of the holding manager leads to an increase in investment demand. These results suggest that the more experienced the farmers are, the more likely they are to invest. It is also true that older farmers are less likely to be credit constrained relative to their younger counterparts, which facilitates investment. p ) is found to increase the area allocated to cereals. Since cereals are the main crop within the sector, a price decline causes a substantial reduction in the farmer's income. To compensate for this decline, farmers increase the quantity produced of this crop to maintain income. It is worthwhile to note that average cereal prices are higher than the alternative crop prices ( Table 4) . As a result, to the extent that the cereal price decline is weak, the shift to the alternative crop may not be attractive enough.
The coefficients representing the lagged stock of capital take values between -1 and 0, implying that capital adjusts to its long-run equilibrium (Boetel, et al., 2007) . Parameter estimates of the dummy variables represent different Spanish Autonomous Communities (m j ) and are not included here to preserve space, though results are available upon request. 
Concluding remarks
Our paper focuses on assessing the impacts of PD payments on investment as well as on other production decisions. Since this is fundamentally an empirical question, we carry out an empirical analysis based upon a reduced-form application of the dual model of investment under uncertainty developed by Sckokai (2005) . The model is estimated using farm-level data from a sample of Spanish farms specialized in COP production and observed during the period 2000-2004.
Our model decision variables include investment demand, variable input use and land allocation. Since some of the dependent variables are censored, a system of censored and non censored equations is estimated using the two-step procedure proposed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) . PD payments are found to increase short-run production by increasing variable input use. An increase in PD area payments is also found to generate a statically significant increase in the investment in farm assets. In this context, the results demonstrate that this support scheme is found to increase long-run production. Results also show the importance of assessing the effects of PD payments in a dynamic framework as the one applied in this paper.
Apart from PD payments, other variables are found to influence investment decisions. These include crop insurance contracting, tenure regime of land, farmers' age, input and output prices, as well as risk. Moreover, PD payments are shown, in some cases, to be more relevant than market prices in influencing investment demand. This is a major contribution of our paper as previous literature using a static framework, arrived at different conclusions. Specifically, prices were found to be more relevant than payments in stimulating production decisions (Moro and Sckokai, 1999 As expected, an increase in risk has a negative impact on farm investment. Compatible with these results, crop insurance contracts reduce risk and thus increase investment demand. Also, increases in output prices tend to increase investments, while increases in input prices reduce investment demand.
Results demonstrate that farmers' land allocation decisions mainly depend on market prices for both inputs and outputs. Also subsidies, labor input use and farmer age are shown to be important variables in explaining production decisions. In the same context, farm wealth and rented land are revealed to be relevant factors in influencing farmer's decisions.
